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Introduction
In this paper, I will argue that the assumption of determinism in strong 
psychological accounts of moral judgment leads to methodological issues, 
which can only be overcome by relinquishing the assumption that such 
reasoning is non-causal. Central to the argument is the claim that while 
conscious and causal reasoning may not account for every moral judg-
ment, it is in most cases at least as desirable an assumption as a type of 
determinism found in strong psychological accounts of moral judgment.
I will begin by defining determinism in the psychological accounts of 
action and moral judgment, mainly in the work of Jonathan Haidt and Daniel 
M. Wegner. It will be found that the strong determinism of these models relies 
on the fact that initial conditions which act as causes of the eventual moral 
judgment cannot be defined. This leads to serious methodological problems 
with regard to the construction of models of mental processes. I will argue that 
even experimental data, which these models frequently use, are not compatible 
with their deterministic assumptions. I will conclude with a brief discussion 
of the almost symmetrically opposed ethical foundation of Immanuel Kant, 
arguing that the assumptions regarding both determinism and free will in 
meta-ethical psychological models is often a result of the assumptions regard-
ing the accessibility of the decision making project by the judging agent. 
1. Determinism in Psychological Accounts of Moral Reasoning 
Some authors have taken the view that free will and the consequent appeal 
to reason to set the course of individual action is mistaken, naive and 
without merit. These authors introduce causes not available to conscious 
reasoning to account for the formulation of judgments and actions in 
which conscious reasoning plays no part. Prominent examples can be 
found in Wegner (2003) and Haidt (2001). The point is made most clearly 
by Wegner:
‘We should be surprised, after all, if cognitive creatures with our 
demonstrably fallible self-insight were capable of perceiving the deepest 
mechanisms of our own minds. The experience of conscious will is 
a marvellous trick of the mind, one that yields useful intuitions about 
our authorship—but it is not the foundation for an explanatory system 
that stands outside the paths of deterministic causation.’ (Wegner, 2003: 
68)
According to Wegner, then, there are deep mechanisms to our minds that 
function without our knowing, while leading us to believe that we, as 
agents, are in charge of it all. Our ‘demonstrably fallible self-insight’ is the 
claim to which Wegner’s proposed model of mental causation of action is 
intended to lend support. While Wegner’s model is broader in scope than 
moral action, it certainly has implications for morality in claiming that 
we are not aware of and therefore unable to change the real causes of our 
actions.
A model that is directly relevant to moral decision making has been 
developed by Haidt (2001). Haidt’s ‘social intuitionist model of moral 
judgment’ intends to answer the question ‘what model of moral judgment 
allows a person to know that something was wrong, without knowing 
why?’ (Haidt 2001: 2). To this end Haidt concentrates on the role of intui-
tions. Intuitions precede reasoning and while moral intuition ‘is a kind of 
cognition, it is not a kind of reasoning’ (Haidt 2001: 2).1
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In the intuitionist model proposed by Haidt, the position of moral 
reasoning and intuitions within th=e time order is of crucial importance. 
‘The central claim of the social intuitionist model is that moral judgment 
is caused by quick moral intuitions, and is followed (when needed) by 
slow, ex-post facto moral reasoning’ (Haidt, 2001: 5). While the claim that 
intuition is quicker than reasoning implies that even if both processes were 
to begin at the same time, reasoning would be concluded later, Haidt’s 
claim is stronger: reasoning ex-post facto applies to judgments already 
made. Reasoning comes after intuition and judgment in the time ordering 
of Haidt’s model. 
This is similar to the position of ‘thought’ in the model proposed 
by Wegner. In Wegner’s model of ‘experience of conscious will’, thought 
occupies the position between unconscious causes of action and the uncon-
scious cause of thought that precedes it, and action which comes after 
thought. The difference between Haidt and Wegner is that for Haidt, ‘rea-
soning’ begins after judgment has taken place, while for Wegner ‘thought’ 
precedes the action. In both accounts, however, the real cause of judgment 
or action precedes conscious thought or reasoning, with neither thought 
nor reason being a necessary condition for  judgment to form.
The similarity between Haidt’s and Wegner’s account does not end 
at the secondary position of conscious thought within the time ordering. 
The actual cause which precedes reasoning is unavailable to the subject, at 
least prior to judgment or action has come to pass. Wegner says as much 
by labelling these causes as unconscious and stating: ‘The actual causal 
paths are not present in the person’s consciousness’ (Wegner, 2003: 66). 
For Haidt, on the other hand, recall that the initial problem appears when 
people form moral judgments without knowing the reason why they have 
formed them, that is without being able to express the intuitions which led 
them to form the judgment. The quick intuitive decisions can sometimes 
be scrutinized by reason after the judgment has been formed.
The late position of thought/reasoning in the time ordering and the 
fact that the judgment process is opaque to the agent means that the models 
of Haidt and Wegner are deterministic in a particular way. Given the ini-
tial intuition or unconscious cause of action, the agent is unable to change 
the action or judgment. The initial conditions set off a causal process that 
the agent can do nothing to influence. There might be some conscious 
thought processes which appear to the agent as having causal power over 
the judgment or action, but this is either an illusion or an after-the-fact 
consideration. Hence the determinism of the Haidt and Wegner models 
has two components: 1) certain mental causes lead to certain judgments or 
actions and not to others; 2) thought or reasoning has no power to change 
actions, in fact they are themselves determined by mental causes.2         
 In the following discussion, more attention will be paid to Haidt’s 
social intuitionist model than to Wegner’s model of illusion of experience 
of free will. It is important for our purposes to note at this point that 
Haidt’s account presents a deterministic model, at least in terms of the 
initial formulation of judgment, which accepts the type of determinism 
Wegner develops in his arguments against the existence of free will. It will 
be shown that this two-pronged determinism is incompatible with other 
requirements of a successful model of mental causation of moral judg-
ment.  
Now that we have discussed an important similarity between Wegner’s 
and Haidt’s accounts,  it is important to consider an important difference 
as well. According to Haidt, it is possible for reasoning to be causal in the 
narrow sense that it can produce an intuition which is contrary to the 
original intuition, or produce a judgment. In such cases, reasoning leads 
to a dual attitude, ‘in which the reasoned judgment may be expressed ver-
bally, yet the intuitive judgment continues to exist under the surface.’ This 
is the ‘reasoned judgment link’ of Haidt’s model, in which reasoning is 
truly causal. However, the reasoned judgment link is ‘rare’ and occurs in 
cases when the ‘initial intuition is weak’ and ’processing capacity is high’ 
(Haidt, 2001: 7). Insofar as the ‘reasoned judgment link’ is activated not 
voluntarily but due to accidental circumstances, I take it to be another 
component of the ‘complete’ deterministic model.3
2. The Requirement of Completeness 
Any psychological model accounting for judgment such as Haidt’s needs 
to be able to account for the mechanism by which an individual agent 
arrives from given initial conditions to a particular outcome and it must 
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also be able to generalise this mechanism to other agents. Without the 
first condition being satisfied there is no model, and without the second 
condition being satisfied the model is not a psychological account of moral 
judgment as such, but is possibly the study of peculiar behaviour of one 
individual.
The model can include considerations other than the initial mental 
cause. We have already seen that under certain circumstances, the slightly 
different ‘reasoned judgment link’ becomes active in Haidt’s model. It has 
also been argued that the models of moral judgment proposed by Haidt 
and Wegner require determinism to be true in the sense that initial men-
tal causes should be exclusive to particular judgments or actions and that 
reasoning cannot influence the outcome of this causal link, of which it is 
itself an effect. 
In this intuitionist model, given the original intuitions of the indi-
vidual, the relevance of the moral context to the individual and the 
background conditions, it must be possible to hypothesise what judgment 
the individual will arrive at, and whether reasoning will occur after the 
judgment has been formed (and if so, through which links). But there 
must also be a general, schematic model, the ‘intuitionist model of moral 
reasoning’, which accounts for at least a substantial number of cases of 
moral reasoning, involving different agents.  
Now, it seems that the intuitionist model of moral reasoning accepts 
that different judgments may be made by different agents under similar 
conditions. This is not in itself an implausible view. More importantly, 
however, this finding is already implicated in experimental data Haidt 
relies on in support of his model.4
In accounting for the different judgments of different agents under 
similar conditions, Haidt’s model needs to postulate a difference in terms 
of the initial intuitions of individuals, or a difference in terms of the influ-
ence of links that operate on initially identical intuitions at a later stage. 
The problem is that since the difference in intuitions tends to determine 
which links are followed (recall that the reasoned judgment link is acti-
vated when the initial intuition is weak and reasoning capacity is high), 
the actual structure of the model does not seem to make any difference in 
terms of explaining why different agents may act differently under similar 
conditions. Even if different pathways are active in different individuals, 
this is a consequence of their differing intuitions.
The claim that intuitions are not accessible to the agent at least until a 
decision has been reached has already been introduced above. This poses a 
major problem for the claim that different intuitions explain why different 
agents act in different ways under the same circumstances. The problem is 
one of measurement but also one of terminological vagueness. Difficulties in 
defining intuition contribute to the problem of how to experimentally define 
and differentiate between different intuitions and their effects on different 
pathways and final judgments. For these reasons, it is unclear what causes the 
decision making process, which  constitutes a methodological problem. 
When explanations are given by referring exclusively to intuitions, and 
any difference between intuitions is supposed to follow from differences 
between judgments as per the exclusivity of causes, the account presup-
poses its conclusion as well as the limits it puts on reasoning. Similarly, 
Wegner’s account assumes its own conclusion, which precludes conscious 
will as a cause. Once various unclear initial conditions of the model are put 
in the position of not only contributing to the outcome, but also deter-
mining the relevant mechanism, reasoning cannot be a cause. It amounts 
to saying that reasoning has no causal powers, because it is actually at best 
an intermediary in a mechanism, which is both shaped and activated by 
something else. We know only that this ‘something else’ exclusively cor-
responds to the effect at hand and that and that further inquiry into its 
nature its futile.5 Notice that exclusivity and opacity are what render these 
accounts deterministic in the first place.          
A related problem is that just as easily as the psychological model thus 
comes to reject reasoning as a cause, it can easily account for all kinds of 
experimental findings regarding moral judgment and action. So we may 
find that the difference between individuals who find the idea of eating 
their pet dog repulsive and those who do not (in the Haidt, Koller and 
Dias study quoted above in footnote 2) can be explained by referring 
exclusively to intuitions. But even the nature of this difference – whether 
it is a matter of logical opposition or based on external circumstances – 
remains a matter of speculation. 
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I have argued in this section that the requirement that models of 
moral judgment be complete for all possible judgments across agents does 
not sit well with the opaque and exclusive determinism of causes in Haidt’s 
psychological model. The danger is that it becomes impossible to falsify 
the model through counterexamples, as each counterexample of mental 
causation can be made to fit in the model. However, without completeness 
within and across agents, the model can hardly claim to account for moral 
decision making, including those cases in which the agent does not know 
the causes of her moral judgment.
Below I suggest that the one potential counterexample to the model, 
a different action of the same agent under the same circumstances, would 
pose problems to the psychological model in question.      
 
3. Inferring Mental Causes and Problems with Completeness 
Above I have claimed that psychological models of moral judgment such as 
Haidt’s make the assumption that different agents can act differently under 
the same circumstances. This is already given in the use of experimental 
data and, furthermore, accepted in explaining different behaviour through 
different intuitions. There is nothing that is prima facie wrong with the 
view that different agents can and often do have different intuitions in 
the same circumstances. However, the model cannot allow for the differ-
ent action of the same individual under the same circumstances without 
proliferating its explanatory mechanisms. In other words, there is no room 
for the assumption that the same individual may act differently under the 
same circumstances in a given form of the model under discussion.
For an agent to act differently under the same circumstances she must 
either have different intuitions, or the causal path followed must be dif-
ferent, i.e. through different links to the final judgment.6 The mechanism 
remains essentially the same and applies to all moral judgments; the only 
difference being that multiple paths could follow the same intuition, lead-
ing to different judgments.
In this case, any deviations from the expected result, the original 
judgment of the agent, could be explained by reference to an inter-
vening factor. For example, increased capacity for processing might 
activate the ‘reasoned judgment link’ although the initial intuitions are 
the same or very similar. But to explain the difference in outcome, this 
interfering factor must be identified, and for purposes of complete-
ness, included in the model. This can only be done provided that the 
intervening factor is of the same (logical or empirical) significance as 
the extant parts of the model, the function of which it will replace for 
the purpose of explaining this case of different judgment. Again the 
‘reasoned judgment link’ provides a good example, since it is genu-
inely causal. The assumption that the intervening factor is unknown 
or improbable concedes that the model is not providing a complete 
description of moral judgment. 
In this light, every different judgment formed under identical circum-
stances requires that an additional causal path be postulated and included 
in the model. The alternative is to explain why intuitions might differ 
under the same circumstances.7     
So far we have argued that the model cannot account for the different 
judgments of the same individual under the same circumstances, in the 
sense that the given model needs to alter in structure in order to account 
for the difference. This is another case of piling on the epicycles. When-
ever an explanation is lacking, proponents of such models of behaviour 
can simply assume that the models are incomplete and add another causal 
mechanism. Note that the problem could easily be resolved by a more 
causally potent description of reasoning. 
It might be objected that since it is never the case that an agent would 
have acted differently under the same conditions, psychological accounts 
such as Haidt’s cannot be criticized for their difficulty in accounting for 
such states of affairs. However, it is another indicator that the model pre-
supposes a form of determinism which denies reasoning casual powers 
and which assumes a rigid and exclusive correspondence of certain men-
tal causes with certain outcomes. This rejection of free will, or the causal 
power of reasoning, seems to contribute to the methodological problems 
of the model, mainly that no plausible counterexamples can be produced 
even hypothetically. 
40
Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy
Barış Kennedy | Conscious Reasoning or Quick Intuition? Psychological 
Accounts of Moral Judgment in between Determinism and Free Will
A possible response to this line of argument is to suggest that the idea 
of accounting for the different actions of an agent under similar conditions 
imposes very strict limits and presupposes its own conclusion. Observa-
tion and experiment might reveal that there is a statistical correlation 
between the newly established causal path and its output. By processes 
of conditioning the interferences with the mechanism may be identified 
and possibly incorporated into the mechanism. In fact, an evolutionary 
account, for example, would expect for this to happen and for its mecha-
nism to maintain a statistically significant trend. Hence, without violating 
the model’s legitimacy, such interferences may be applied to cases in which 
the same agent may have acted differently under the same conditions . 
As far as intuitionist models relying on experimentation are concerned, 
one could reply that such an objection only holds if the interference is as 
statistically significant as the other parts of the model.8 In other words, 
the interfering factor must be just as observable or explainable as admit-
ted parts of the model. To concede this would be to admit that there are 
certain interfering factors that render, when present, the already accepted 
mechanism unnecessary. Hence the theory must be improved and either 
made to account for the genuine cause or must be abandoned in favour of 
another theory which can do without spurious causes. The model in ques-
tion simply fails as a causal explanation, if it can always account for the 
difference of the actions in individual agents under the same conditions. 
This implies that there are more factors at work in moral judgment than it 
has taken into account.   
The point is that in models such as Haidt’s, in which the ethical con-
tent of initial causes is unavailable, the model has links which account 
for different outcomes in terms of the outcomes themselves. It does so 
by connecting it to a specific process internal to its mechanism. The deci-
sion-making process remains unobserved and opaque. At the same time, 
the number of different mechanistic processes contributing to decision-
making may be equal to the number of judgments in need of explanation.
Hence, the model will keep repeating itself for every new action of an 
agent under the same circumstances.
It might be claimed against my objections above that not every moral 
judgment is made through reasoning and this is an experimentally identi-
fiable finding. One might claim that models such as Haidt’s are succesful 
because they propose a mechanism that can explain that and how moral 
judgment is possible in the absence of reasoning. 
Even if we were to accept this limited aim of the psychological model 
it solves very little. The question of how to account for different behaviour 
of an agent under the same circumstances now becomes far more pressing, 
as it seems to be admitted that there is a reasoned outcome and an intui-
tive outcome. The model has to argue for the cases for which it is relevant. 
This can only be done, however, if the question of differing actions of 
the same agent under the same circumstances collapses into the question 
of differing actions of different agents under the same circumstances. The 
empirical data which is cited in support of the model’s explanatory power 
actually consists of cases in which different agents have acted differently 
under  (approximately) identical situations. The desired argument is only 
possible if, as a result of the different individuals acting differently under 
(approximately) stable conditions, the model has sufficient information to 
posit different causal paths or links within the model’s structure, enabling 
it to explain different outcomes. But since the mechanism is supposed 
to operate at the individual level, the model constructed over the differ-
ent actions of many individuals is applied to each individual.9 Agents are 
then left with the possibility of variant action, which they have not been 
observed to perform, and which they may never perform.
In response, one might claim that such a criticism may be levelled at 
any conclusion to be drawn from experimentation and is simply vacuous 
if one wants to rely on such information for practical purposes. The objec-
tion is valid in the following sense: it does not follow that just because 
someone does not smoke and does not get lung cancer, experimental 
and statistical data as well as the physiological mechanism which caus-
ally relates smoking to lung cancer do not hold for this person. Had the 
person been a smoker, her risk of lung cancer would have been increased. 
Similarly, one can claim that people are liable to act more aggressively in an 
environment with loud noise. However, the issue at stake being whether 
the model we have developed based on group findings can be applied at 
the individual level, we must also account for the exceptions, unless it can 
be unequivocally shown that certain initial conditions always lead to the 
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same outcome in a representative sample. Continuing the medical analogy, 
let us say that the exception is not developing lung cancer despite years of 
heavy smoking. Now it is a case of coming up with an intrinsic mecha-
nistic explanation, as part of the model, for people who have been heavy 
smokers all their lives and who have not developed lung cancer.  Perhaps 
no such explanation is forthcoming: lung cancer is simply prevented or 
pre-empted by other circumstantial factors. Or perhaps a genetic factor 
provides our intrinsic mechanistic explanation. However: either a person 
has the gene (or any other identifiable factor), which explains why she did 
not develop lung cancer despite years of heavy smoking, or she does not, 
in which case we would expect her to have developed lung cancer. Either 
way, the explanation lies with the individual’s constitution. Given our best 
explanation in the terms outlined: could the individual under the same cir-
cumstances (of her life) have (or not have) developed lung cancer? No, we 
would not expect the outcome to change. Could another person have (or 
not have) developed lung cancer, given the same life circumstances? Given 
our genetic explanation, a change in outcome is indeed possible. 
This example is intended to show that individual differences cannot 
be precisely accounted for by applying a model generalised for a group at 
the individual level. To the question of why a particular individual did 
not get a disease despite being at risk of contracting that disease, saying 
some people do not get the disease because of factor x is not an adequate 
explanation, unless we are also told that this particular individual exhibits 
factor x. It is at this point that psychological theories of moral judgment or 
action with opaque and exclusive causes fail; even if we accept that in gen-
eral there are such unconscious causes of judgment which operate through 
such and such processes, there is no way in which it can be ascertained that 
a given judgment on the part of an individual was indeed caused by such 
a process..10 These procesess include an agent’s reflection on her judgment, 
since the causal process that led to said judgment remains opaque to her. 
It seems that we are reduced to speculation. A theory that ascribes causal 
powers to reasoning presents the less cumbersome and the more intui-
tive alternative. At the very least one can accept without much ado that 
conscious reasoning may be different in its components (e.g. premises) in 
different individuals, resulting in differences in judgment.    
4. The Failure of the Deterministic Psychological Model
This is not the place to argue the relative merits of a concept of reasoning 
that presupposes the existence of free will and determined intuitions; it is 
sufficient to observe that Haidt’s model does not succeed in producing a 
better explanation of moral judgment than the rationalist view it criticises. 
Haidt’s model may be able to explain peculiar cases of moral uncer-
tainty, cases in which the agent is certain of the moral judgment, but 
cannot account for it or give reasons. In Haidt’s words: ‘In the social intui-
tionist model it becomes plausible to say I don’t know, I can’t explain it, I 
just know it’s wrong.’ (Haidt, 2001: 2) Anyone who professes this opinion 
has, according to Haidt, formed a judgment through intuitions, which 
cannot be corrected or argued for, and is stuck with avowing the normative 
value placed on that which is wrong. 
This theory of unreasonable moral judgments, however, renders every 
moral judgment uncertain, possibly over the protestations of the judging 
agent herself. We have seen that the account is very troubled methodo-
logically. Its deterministic assumption of opaque, exclusive causes leading 
to judgment with no possible interference by reasoning leaves nothing 
unexplained  and is impossible to dispute, while being very difficult to 
empirically verify. 
In conclusion the time-ordered deterministic intuitionist model 
of Haidt fails to deliver an acceptable account of how a range of moral 
judgments are produced in individual agents. This remark has certain cor-
ollaries. Firstly, determinism is latent in Haidt, but as this essay attempts to 
display, this is precisely the problem. In the light of opaque and exclusive 
determinism of causes, the system of modelling used simply cannot admit 
of a single type of cause, such as intuitions, without running into meth-
odological troubles. The limited role of reasoning in Haidt, which make 
it depend on intuitions even when truly causal, presents reason only as an 
ad hoc consideration, which renders the theory even less falsifiable. My 
proposal is that the assumption of determinism be made explicit and a cor-
rection be made to the overdetermination of both causal and time-ordered 
positioning of intuitions and reasoning, so that reasoning can precede 
some intuitions. The model may be made more specific for certain types 
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of moral reasoning and judgement and allow for the agent’s awareness that 
decision-making is a mental process even in those cases. As I hope to have 
shown, it is a tall order to accept at face value a statement ‘I don’t know 
why, I just know it is wrong’ if ‘I don’t know’ why here means ‘I cannot 
elaborate any further on the causes’.11      
I want to suggest that the fundamental problem of the psychologi-
cal account of Haidt is that judgments and intuitions are completely 
interchangeable; they do not differ in content. Not only is there no valid 
or invalid judgment, true or false intuition; there is also no distinction 
between moral judgments in terms of type (as one finds in Kohlberg, whom 
Haidt quotes extensively). It is suggested that reasoning may supplement 
such categories, but of course, it hardly plays a part in forming judgments. 
Since without knowledge of its content we have no way of establishing 
that intuition x leads to judgment y (as if one could be logically derived 
from the other) we have to accept the very troublesome requirement of 
exclusive causes of each particular judgment at face level. This condition 
then necessitates determinism in the sense that (1) given the particular 
initial conditions there can be no different outcome and that (2) reasoning 
cannot be causal.
Interestingly, the connection between aspects of moral decision-
making and the question of free will can run in the completely opposite 
direction. A meta-ethical theory which does not separate between the 
grounding of moral judgement and the form of morality itself runs the 
opposite difficulty of having to insist on an absolute conception of free 
will. Immanuel Kant’s practical philosophy exemplifies this later point.
5. Kant and the Moral Law         
I want to briefly examine the Kantian position in order to claim that theo-
ries on judgment forming have to confront the problem of free will and 
determinism. It seems with regard to this problem, Kant’s position does 
not follow from a priori statements about freedom, but by the require-
ments of his meta-ethical model regarding the structure of judgment 
making. Of particular importance is the agent’s awareness of the act of 
judging and to what extent this is an essential part of judging. We have 
seen that the psychological models of Haidt and Wegner render this very 
process unconscious or otherwise unavailable to the mind and converge on 
determinism. The opposite choice is to be found in Kant, for whom our 
knowledge or freedom is guaranteed by apperception. This idea of the pos-
sibility of ethics being implied by ethics itself constitutes an identification 
of ethics with meta-ethics.  
In the preface to the Critique of Practical Reason Kant famously 
declares:
‘Lest anyone should imagine that he finds an inconsistency here when 
I call freedom the condition of the moral law and hereafter maintain in 
the treatise itself that the moral law is the condition under which we can 
first become conscious of freedom, I will merely remark that freedom 
is the ratio essendi of the moral law, while the moral law is the ratio 
cognoscendi of freedom.’ (Kant, 1788/1996: 140)
This, of course, presents a stark contrast with the investigation of the con-
cept of freedom as an antinomy in the Critique of Pure Reason. Freedom, 
having been denied theoretical value in laying down the foundations of 
knowledge for pure reason, now makes a comeback, despite Kant’s insist-
ence in the first Critique that: ‘(...) and if we could exhaustively investigate 
all the appearances of men’s wills, there would not be found a single 
human action which we could not predict with certainty, and recognise as 
proceeding necessarily from its antecedent conditions’. (A549-550/B577-
8, translation BK)
In his book ‘Kant’s Theory of Freedom’, Henry Allison points out 
that in this passage ‘Kant is advocating not only a strict determinism at 
the empirical level but also a psychological determinism’ (Allison, 1990: 
31; emphasis in the original). Why did then Kant change the outlook 
he had established in his first Critique when it came to morality, leading 
many commentators to draw a sharp distinction between his theoretical 
and practical philosophy, often at the detriment of the latter?
As indicated above, I claim that this was the result of Kant’s identifica-
tion of meta-ethics with ethics, which arose from his view of reason. While 
it is not the aim of this paper to offer a comprehensive interpretation of 
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the Kantian practical philosophy, it must be pointed out that reason in this 
context occupies a pivotal role, as the starting point of every ‘model’ which 
can explain behaviour. This is the role played by apperception, which 
means being aware of the operation of a faculty of reason, not retrospec-
tively but as a necessary consequence of such an operation as judging. Any 
judgement in itself might appear necessary, and theoretically it is; for it is 
made either in accordance with the categorical imperative or with nature. 
However, apperception allows for an explanation of, or at least reasoning 
on, how a judgement comes about. It is appropriate to quote at length 
from the Critique of Practical Reason here to show the significance of this 
point of view:
‘Whether he would or not perhaps he will not venture to say; but that it 
would be possible for him he would certainly admit without hesitation. 
He judges, therefore, that he can do something because he knows that 
he ought, and he recognised therein his freedom, which, without the 
moral law, would have remained unknown to him.’ (Kant, 1788/1996: 
163-164)
Notice that the consideration of doing what is right establishes the moral 
law, which in turn establishes freedom, which, as we saw above is the ratio 
essendi of the moral law. Fine points of transcendental deduction aside, 
what lies at the root of this reasoning is the truism, ‘I may or may not do 
something I know to be right’.
In Haidt we saw that any judgment can be explained in terms of 
original intuitions and accepted to be a moral judgment of the agent, 
even if the agent has no insight into the formation of that judgment. 
There is no distinction between types of judgment. In Kant we see 
that judgement has the potential to be moral. Here lies the difference 
between the assumption of determinism in one case and the assumption 
of freedom in the other. Kant’s meta-ethics is concerned with identifying 
the necessary grounds for the possibility of correct judgement according 
to a certain conception of the ethical. By way of contrast, Haidt’s indif-
ference to the ethical content of judgment allows him to account for all 
judgments as a purely cognitive type, determined by the uniform nature 
of cognition. 
Ethical considerations such as the categorical imperative inform the 
Kantian view of what judgments may be considered under the moral cate-
gory and therefore as free, in the Kantian sense. While there is no reason to 
uncritically accept this point of view, it is still able to answer methodologi-
cal questions like those we have wrestled with above, such as the ability to 
account for the different action of individuals in the same circumstances. 
Assuming free will seems to make it easier for the Kantian position to 
allow for every instance of moral judgment admits of the same mechanism 
or process which is uniform across individuals.
It would be misleading to suggest that Kant’s abandonment of his the-
oretical view of freedom in favour of a new one for his practical philosophy 
was unproblematic. As mentioned, most critics were rather unimpressed 
with Kant’s ‘deduction of freedom’. His views on the empirical as neces-
sarily determined and the knowledge of freedom for moral purposes led 
him to what is called the ‘two-world view’, where the agent is considered 
to be empirically causally determined but noumenally free. This is a very 
controversial proliferation of ontology; furthermore it is problematic in its 
transcendental idealist assumptions. 
Conclusion
The comparison between the assumed free will in the Kantian position 
and the structurally problematic determinism of the models of Haidt and 
Wegner exposes a dilemma for strong psychological accounts of moral 
judgment. The problem is whether to admit of the relationship between 
the content of moral intuitions and judgment as influenced by reasoning 
or not. If we admit of such reasoned content as ‘incest is wrong whatever 
the outcome; it is wrong even if no one got hurt’, the focus turns towards 
the structural analysis of reasoning and the question whether the judgment 
is sound, in order to show that it ought to be preferred to ‘any action is 
permissible so long as no one gets hurt’. We will be engaged in the practice 
of ethics and a typology of judgments insofar as there are clearly measur-
able individual differences between groups of such judges, in meta-ethics 
such as the one practiced by Kohlberg. No mechanism will be available 
to explain situations in which the agent insists on a judgment despite all 
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argument to the contrary. But if we decide to account for these cases, we 
have to turn to an account of moral judgment which is indifferent to the 
content of judgments. This in turn relies on an unwelcome type of strong 
determinism with severe methodological handicaps. 
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Notes
1. Intuitions form the mainstay of Haidt’s social intuitionist model and have their own 
‘link’ or ‘process’: the intuitive judgment link. Other types of moral cogitation fall into 
five other types of link, but it is important to note that moral judgment always starts 
with the initial intuitive judgment link (Haidt, 2001: 7).
2. The first point on one to one correspondence between mental causes and their 
outcomes may not seem obvious. The point is that since these accounts begin with 
observations of action or communicated moral judgment, and since they pose a set of 
mental phenomena as the causes of observed behaviour, they have no choice but to 
assign different causes to different effects exclusively. 
3. The main function of reasoning in Haidt’s model is not as a cause of moral judg-
ments, but as a means of justifying decisions to one’s self and persuading others of the 
value of the moral decision. I do not treat of the ‘social’ aspect of Haidt’s model.
4. For example, regarding the Haidt, Koller and Dias (1993) study cited by Haidt 
(2001) on page 5, Haidt says ‘The stories were carefully constructed so that no plausi-
ble harm could be found, and most participants directly stated that nobody was hurt 
by the actions in question. Yet participants still usually said the actions were wrong, 
and universally wrong’ [emphases mine]. Though we are not given the proportion of 
participants who may or may not have acted in these ways, presumably some partici-
pants judged it best not to say that the actions did not hurt anyone and others may 
have even judged that the actions were not universally, or otherwise, wrong.  
5. Admittedly in Haidt, the intuition can be investigated by retrospective reasoning, 
but it cannot be changed, or even understood in its role within the causal chain. It can 
only be voiced. In Haidt there is an underlying assumption that the intuition, propo-
sitionally expressed, is the same as the concluding proposition of a line of reasoning. 
Only in terms of functioning do intuitions and reasoning differ. (see Haidt, 2001, 
Table 1).
6. Since the model seems to assume every different outcome to have a different cause, 
the agent must have different intuitions under the same circumstances. This is another 
consequence of the vagueness of the initial cause in Haidt’s model. But I will assume 
for argument’s sake that an intuition or sufficiently similar intuitions may still follow 
different causal paths to different judgments.    
7. This presumably calls for an analysis of whether intuitions have stable qualities in 
individuals over time. While the possibility of such an analysis is not to be ruled out, 
for the theoretical burden intuition bears in these psychological models, its absence is 
certainly a negative point. 
8. Since claiming the effect of unknown or improbable interfering factors would be 
just another way of claiming that the theory does not work for unknown reasons.
9. The use of the first person plural in talking about such models serves this confusion. 
Sentences such as  ‘We frequently form negative opinions due to negative environmen-
tal factors without being aware of this’ abound in the literature. ‘We’ as in me, you, 
him and her or ‘we’ as in the experimental sample? 
10. There is the further point that in our smoking causes lung cancer example the pre-
ventative genetic factor is introduced as a causal factor without any strong assumption 
of determinism. In this case it is simply a sufficient reason. Intuitionist determinist 
models, on the other hand, need to point at the determining power of the intuition 
and the resulting causal chain, without clear empirical evidence for such a mechanism. 
Again we come to the issue of inferring a mechanism from observed behaviour, where 
the proof of the mechanism does not seem forthcoming. It is telling that the medical 
establishment only accepted the connection between smoking and lung cancer after 
the mechanistic evidence of how tobacco smoke damages the lungs was given, despite 
there being good statistical evidence beforehand (Machamer et al, 2000). This is a 
more general point about methodology, compared to the problem of applicability at 
the individual level given above.
11. Rationalisation, which Haidt sees as the main function of reasoning, need not 
always produce logical arguments from admissible premises. The participant who 
reacts to the vignette about incest in which neither of the siblings is harmed in any 
way (Haidt, 2001:2) can still successfully rationalise his objection with the following 
two premises: 1) Incest is taboo; 2)What is taboo must not be done.   
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